A Step Toward Workfare: The Supports to Employment Program and Sole Support Mothers by Smart, Steven
Journal of Law and Social Policy
Volume 6 Article 8
1990
A Step Toward Workfare: The Supports to
Employment Program and Sole Support Mothers
Steven Smart
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Social Policy by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Smart, Steven. "A Step Toward Workfare: The Supports to Employment Program and Sole Support Mothers." Journal of Law and Social
Policy 6. (1990): 226-255.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol6/iss1/8
A STEP TOWARD WORKFARE:
THE SUPPORTS TO EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM
AND SOLE SUPPORT MOTHERS
Steven Smart*
The involvement of sole support mothers with the social assistance
system in Ontario dates back to the Mothers Allowance Act of 1920-the
first direct income transfer program in the province. A new chapter in
this involvement has recently opened with the implementation of
STEP-the Supports to Employment Program. This paper will exam-
ine STEP's impact on sole support mothers, and its likely political
consequences.
Although this paper focuses on sole support mothers, STEP and social
assistance reform generally have a broader impact. This focus has
been chosen because 30% of social assistance recipients are sole sup-
port parents, and 85% of these are women 2. Sole support mothers and
their children together constitute about 37% of all social assistance
beneficiaries 3. Not only are sole support mothers a major part of the
social assistance caseload, social assistance is relevant to the lives of a
large portion of all sole support mothers. One third of all female
headed families in Ontario receive social assistance4.
* Copyright * 1990 Steven Smart. Steven Smart is a student at Osgoode Hall Law
School in Downsview, Ontario. This paper was written for the Intensive Program
in Poverty Law and is published here as part of the special arrangement which
the Journal has with that program. As part of the program, students work at
Parkdale Community Legal Services in Toronto, Ontario. Selected papers written
by students in the program are reviewed by the Journal for possible publication.
1. Social Assistance Review Committee (hereinafter SARC), Transitions
(Toronto: 1988) at 72.
2. Ibid. at 30, 31.
3. Ibid. at 30-32. This figure was calculated by multiplying the percentage of
beneficiaries who are children (37%) by the portion of child beneficiaries liv-
ing in families led by sole support parents (75%), adding the percentage of
beneficiaries who are sole support parents themselves (16%), and multiplying
the total by the percentage of sole support parents who are women (85%).
4. Ibid. at 30.
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The high degree of involvement of sole support mothers with social
assistance is indicative of the disadvantaged position of women in
society generally. The disadvantages faced by women in the labour
market are substantial and will be explored later in this paper. Fur-
thermore, women both within and outside of the labour market tend
to be relegated to performing a kind of work that, although important
and worthwhile, is undervalued in our society. This work, sometimes
termed "women's work," has been described as "the direct servicing of
people's immediate needs."5 Both the undervaluing of this work and
the fact that its burden falls inequitably on women are aspects of the
way that women are socially disadvantaged.
The social assistance system itself also tends to have a more adverse
impact on women than on men. Elizabeth Wilson argues in the con-
text of the United Kingdom that welfare operates in a way that forces
women "to keep to their primary task as adults. This is the task of
reproducing the work force."6 Welfare thus offers "a unique demon-
stration of how the State can prescribe what woman's consciousness
should be."7 She points to the way that the rules and requirements of
social assistance reflect assumptions and views generally held in soci-
ety regarding the family and the role of women.8 For example, a
woman who lives with a man is expected to be supported by him and
therefore loses her welfare entitlement 9. Since- these attitudes are often
repressive toward women, social assistance necessarily has a more
adverse impact on women than on men.
For these reasons, the impact of STEP on sole support mothers is par-
ticularly worthy of attention.
5. H. Wainwright, "Women and the Division of Labor" in Philip Abrams, ed.,
Work, Urbanism and Inequality: U.K. Society Today (London: Winfield and Nicol-
son, 1978) at 168.
6. E. Wilson, Women and the Welfare State (London: Tavistock, 1977) at 8.
7. Ibid. at 7.
8. Wilson emphasizes that both welfare rules and generally held attitudes
toward women result from repression by the State: "Women encounter state
repression within the very bosom of the family", at 9.
9. Ibid. at 13.
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The first section of this paper describes STEP and its political context,
highlighting certain features that are relevant to sole support mothers.
The next section examines the financial incentives to employment that
sole support mothers will face under STEP. The third section ques-
tions the relevance of financial incentives generally to the decisions
regarding work and welfare that sole support mothers make. The
paper concludes by examining the possible political implications of
STEP.
A. WHAT IS STEP?
On May 18, 1989 the Ontario government announced "a new agenda
for social assistance"10 in Ontario. A reform package was announced
that included increased shelter allowances, increased and simplified
children's benefits, increased funding for employment support services,
additional funding for literacy training, and the elimination of certain
inequities such as the differential treatment of men and women aged
60 to 65 years. The centrepiece of the reform package was the Supports
to Employment Program, or STEP. STEP "is intended to remove bar-
riers to employment for individuals receiving social assistance."11 It
attempts to remove the economic disincentives to employment within
the social assistance system itself. STEP came into effect on October 1,
1989.
STEP changes the existing rules in seven ways:
1. Single parents are no longer subject to an arbitrary maximum of
120 hours of work per month to maintain categorical eligibility.
2. Net employment earnings are used instead of gross earnings in
calculating the reduction of social assistance benefits. However,
only Canada Pension, Unemployment Insurance, and income tax
deductions are considered allowable deductions from gross earn-
ings. This means that the "net earnings" amount can still exceed
the recipient's actual take-home pay.
10. Statement to the Legislature by The Honourable John Sweeney, Minister of
Community and Social Services, May 18, 1989, at 1.
11. Ministry of Community and Social Services (hereinafter referred to as
COMSOC) news release entitled "Sweeney unveils $415 million in sweeping
reforms to Ontario's social assistance system", May 18, 1989, at 1.
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3. Single parents can deduct child care expenses from their employ-
ment earnings in calculating the reduction of their benefits. If the
child care is unlicensed, the deduction is subject to a ceiling
amount of $390 for each child under age 5, and $346 for each
child aged 5 to 12 years.
4. Basic exemptions from earned income are increased. For single
parents, the exemption is $175 per month.
5. The amount of employment income remaining after the above
exemptions is taxed back at a rate of only 80%, ie. 80% of the
remaining income is deducted from the social assistance entitle-
ment. The reduction was previously dollar-for-dollar.
6. A "buffer zone" is introduced which allows recipients to continue
to receive health benefits even when their entitlement to social
assistance is reduced to zero due to income from employment
Chargeable employment earnings must exceed the previous social
assistance entitlement by less than a specified amount ($100 for
single parents.)
7. Treatment of income from training allowances is changed. This
income is subjected to different rules than employment income
under STEP. A recipient automatically becomes subject to STEP
when she reports income from employment or a training allow-
ance. A portion of such income, termed "chargeable earnings" is
deducted from the recipient's cheque. Chargeable earnings are the
actual earnings, less the exempted amounts (mandatory deduc-
tions, basic exemption, and allowable child care), and less 20% of
the remainder. If chargeable earnings exceed the welfare or Fam-
ily Benefits entitlement by $100 or less (in the case of a sole sup-
port parent), the recipient receives a cheque for the minimum
amount of $2.50 as well as health benefits.
The calculation to determine the entitlement of a recipient with
employment income is set out in detail in Appendix "A" to this paper.
Appendix "A" is a worksheet that was prepared by the author for use
with recipients and potential recipients, entitled "Would You be Better
Off Working?"
1. STEP IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
STEP and the related initiatives announced with it did not arise in a
political vacuum. They came after an intensive lobbying campaign,
mounted by recipient groups and their allies, that focused on imple-
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mentation of Transitions. STEP must be understood as a part of this
ongoing political process if we wish to consider the likely implications
of STEP for future social assistance reform in Ontario.
Transitions divided its reform program into five stages. The first of
these stages, intended as a program for the first year of reform, identi-
fied the most glaring inadequacies of the system and did not include
the more controversial recommendations, such as implementation of
opportunity planning and income supplementation for the working
poor1 2. Consequently, implementation of Stage 1 of Transitions formed
a rallying point around which a wide range of interest groups were
able to gather.
The voices calling for implementation of the Stage 1 reforms ulti-
mately came to include recipients, social service professionals, reli-
gious groups, labour, municipal government and big business.13 These
diverse interest groups had widely varying reasons for supporting
Stage 1. Some saw it as a step toward a more just distribution of
wealth, while others saw it as a prudent investment in human
resources intended to prevent even greater expense in future. Neverthe-
less, all were able to agree on the short term action they wanted gov-
ernment to take.
The Government took no action on Transitions between its release in
September 1988 and the 1989 budget in May of the following year.
During this time, support for implementation of Stage 1 steadily grew.
Prominent newspaper ads, paid for with money from the private
Laidlaw Foundation, appeared in major newspapers. The March on
Poverty drew 3,000 to Queen's Park in April and received widespread
media attention. Even the Legislature's all party Standing Committee
on Finance and Economic Affairs, in its report on its annual pre-bud-
get public consultation, unanimously endorsed implementation of
Stage 1 as its primary recommendation 14.
12. SARC, supra, note I at 529-532.
13. For a description of the lobbying effort, see Bruce Bos, "SARC, Transitions,
and the Lobby for Implementation: Who Really Controls Social Assistance
Reform in Ontario?" (unpublished, 1989).
14. Ontario Legislature, Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs,
"Pre-Budget Consultation 1989," (Toronto: 1989).
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The Government's response to this was to announce a package of
reforms to social assistance that looked something like Stage 1, but
was not Stage 1. Stage I was to have cost $415 million; the announced
reforms also cost $415 million. The announcement was carefully
worded to express support for Transitions without stating that Transi-
tions was being implemented. For example:
"Mr. Sweeney said that the new agenda is based on recommenda-
tions contained in the report of the Social Assistance Review Com-
mittee as well as advice he received from a variety of individuals
and groups across Ontario.
"The initiatives we are undertaking reflect our own consideration of
priorities while at the same time, capture the essence of Transitions,
the report of the Social Assistance Review Committee" said Mr.
Sweeney.
"Today's agenda is the result of three years of careful study," said
Mr. Sweeney. "I thank the Social Assistance Review Committee for
its excellent work..."
15
Clearly the Government wanted to create the impression that the polit-
ical pressure was being responded to, and Transitions was being imple-
mented in some form. In fact, the announced reforms implement only
a fraction of the Stage 1 recommendations. Of 62 specific recommen-
dations included in Stage 1, the implementation of only about 13 was
announced 16. The following is a partial list of Stage 1 recommenda-
tions that were not implemented: reduction of categories of eligibility;
raising asset ceilings; making sponsored immigrants eligible pending
sponsorship enforcement; adoption of a market basket approach to
adequacy; improving staff workload and case ratios; tighter and
clearer rules to guide discretion; a simplified application process; a
new disability determination process; improvements to the Social
Assistance Review Board; and provincial funding of Special Assis-
tance at 80%.
15. COMSOC News Release, May 18, 1989, supra, note 11 at I and 3.
16. SARC, supra, note I at 529-532. This figure can only be a rough approxima-
tion because it is not clear whether certain recommendations have been
implemented or not. For example, it is not known whether STEP will extend
eligibility for GWA to recipients working full time who remain in need, as
was recommended. Only eight recommendations were clearly implemented
in full.
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Stage 1 encompassed much broader improvements to the system than
are represented by STEP and the other announced reforms. The Gov-
ernment has suggested that broader changes must await new legisla-
tion. However Transitions did not recommend deferring the above
changes until new legislation is ready, even though it did recommend
new legislation at a later stage.
The Government's May 18, 1989 announcement fell far short of imple-
mentation of Stage 1 of Transitions. Nevertheless, the elements of STEP
were among the Stage 1 recommendations of Transitions. They address
one of the major concerns raised by recipients: the financial barriers
to employment created by the system itself. Can this not be viewed as
a partial success?
In fact, the Government was aware of the problem addressed by STEP
long before Transitions was published or the Social Assistance Review
Committee struck. In December 1985, six months before the establish-
ment of SARC, the Ministry of Community and Social Services
released a public statement setting forth its long term goals and strate-
gies. Objective number 1 was "to ensure that Ontario's income support
system provides help and incentives to those who can return to work..
"17 The strategy to reach this objective was to "review the effective-
ness of income support programs and assess their... flexibility to
encourage and ease transition to the work force."18 Thus the creation
of incentives to enter the work force was already on the Governments
agenda before the review process had even begun.
On April 1, 1987, the Ontario Government entered into an agreement
with the Government of Canada regarding the employability of social
assistance recipients. This agreement, known as the "four-cornered
agreement" because it was signed by two federal ministers and two
provincial ministers, implemented an earlier agreement reached at a
federal-provincial conference on September 18, 1985. The essence of
the agreement was that funds from the Canada Assistance Plan would
be diverted from social assistance to programs intended to enhance
the employability of recipients. The problem of financial disincentives
to employment was recognized and addressed. The Ontario Govern-
ment agreed to the following:
17. COMSOC, "Investing in Ontario's Future: Strategic Directions for the Ministry
of Community and Social Services" (December 1985, revised June 1986), at 17.
18. Ibid. at 19.
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"Social assistance programs will be reviewed and adjusted, as
appropriate, to provide positive incentives and the retention of non-
cash benefits for those social assistance recipients participating in
programs pursuant to this Letter of Understanding to assist the
social assistance recipients with the transition from social assis-
tance to training and employment." 19
Thus, the Government had already committed itself to changing social
assistance to provide financial incentives to at least those recipients
participating in federally funded training programs. STEP goes
beyond this, but the basic principle was already established before
Transitions was released.
2. STEP AND CHILD CARE
Two of the initiatives contained in STEP, the deduction of child care
expenses and the removal of the 120 hour rule, are directed specific-
ally toward "single parents," the vast majority of whom are women20 .
The recognition of child care costs as "a legitimate work related
expense"2 1 which may be deducted from employment income is per-
haps the most significant feature of the program. However, the govern-
ment is not paying for child care costs under STEP. Child care
expenses will come out of the mother's earnings, and not out of funds
provided by welfare or Family Benefits. This has two implications: a
woman is only better off working under STEP by the amount that her
net employment earnings exceed her child care expenses; and an
increase in child care costs will not automatically be met by an
increase in funds to pay for it.
These two points are best illustrated by an example. Consider the situ-
ation of a sole support mother working 40 hours per week at $5.00 per
hour. Her gross monthly income is $866. Her net monthly income can
be estimated as 90% of this amount2 , or $779. If she has two children
19. "Letter of Understanding between Canada and Ontario on Enhancing the
Employability of Social Assistance Recipients", April 1, 1987, at 2.
20. See Felicite Stairs, "Sole Support Mothers and 'Opportunity Planning' in the
Thomson Report", [unpublished 19881 at 53 and 54.
21. COMSOC News Release, supra, fact sheet *1.
22. The figure of 10% of gross income for mandatory deductions is a very rough
approximation based on examination of the actual amounts deducted for
the three mandatory deductions. CPP and UI are about 2% each, and
income tax varies between 4% and 8% for typical earnings levels.
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aged less than 5 years in unlicensed day care (ie. with a babysitter),
and the babysitter charges $3.50 per hour for 45 hours per week,
monthly child care expenses are $682.
Total exemptions in this situation are $175 for the flat rate exemption,
plus the entire $682 for child care ($682 is lower than the applicable
ceiling amount of $780 for unlicensed care for the two children).
Therefore total exemptions are $857, an amount which exceeds the net
earnings of $779.
The result is that none of the earnings from employment will be
deducted from her welfare of Family Benefits entitlement as the entire
amount is exempt. This means that she will be better off working by
$97 per month. $97 is the difference between her net employment
earnings and her child care expenses. Her welfare or Family Benefits
cheque will not decrease, but almost all of the additional income from
working will be spent on child care. If the government were actually
paying for the child care or subsidizing it, she would benefit far more.
In the above example, no amount of additional child care expenses
would result in the recipient having any more money in her pocket
with which to pay for it. She is already receiving the maximum
amount available to her from the government, namely, her previous
welfare or Family Benefits entitlement. Under these circumstances the
ceiling on unlicensed care deductions is irrelevant She would be in
the same position financially if there were no ceiling at all.
If her child care expenses were to increase, the increase would come
out of her own pocket and would not be matched by an increase in
assistance from the government. Only an increase in welfare or Family
Benefits rates (or wages) would give her more money with which to
pay for increased child care costs.
3. THE NOTCH EFFECT
Child care expenses are not the only expenses that increase with
employment Others, like transportation and clothing, are not taken
directly into account in the calculation 23. Of particular note are the
effects of increased income on subsidies that a sole support mother
23. There is a $250 "Employment Start-up Benefit" to cover the costs of beginning
to work. It is payable as often as once per year, and is not deducted from subse-
quent entitlement.
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may already be receiving, such as public housing and child care subsi-
dies. The "notch effect" of reductions in these subsidies may negate
any financial benefit the recipient would otherwise derive from
employment under STEP.
Child care subsidies are based on ability to pay, which is defined as
the difference between household income and allowable household
expenses, less certain exemptions (for example, 25% of earned income
is exempted.) Before STEP, recipients of social assistance were deemed
to have an income of zero for purposes of the subsidy calculation, and
were eligible for a full subsidy. However, recipients on STEP will be
assessed according to their actual income, including both earned
income and social assistance.24 This means that, if total income
exceeds allowable expenses plus exemptions, 75% of any increase in
income from earnings will have to be spent on child care expenses
because the subsidy will be reduced by that much.
Recipients in subsidized housing may find that their rent increases as
a result of increased income. In MTHA (Metro Toronto Housing
Authority) housing, for example, 25% of any increase in income must
be devoted to rent. This rent increase can easily exceed the financial
benefit a recipient would derive from STEP.2
B. INCENTIVES UNDER STEP
This program treats you like white bread. You know what they do
to white bread-the take all the goodness out, then put 20% back in
and call it enriched. This is a very enriched program.
- reaction of one FB recipient to the STEP program
STEP is an attempt to improve the financial incentives faced by social
assistance recipients as they contemplate whether or not to enter the
workforce. The stated goal of the program is to make it easier for
social assistance recipients to work. Therefore, one way of evaluating
the effectiveness of STEP is to examine what the financial incentive to
work will actually amount to in light of existing labour market condi-
24. This is based on a conversation with a supervisor at Metro Toronto Children's
Services, December 11, 1989.
25. At the time of writing, there is a possibility that MTHA will exempt tenants
participating in STEP from such rent increases, but this is uncertain.
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ions and availability of child care. This section will attempt to quan-
tify the financial incentives that will typically be faced by sole support
mothers under STEP.
Two major variables determine the work incentive that will be faced
by a sole support mother. wages of available jobs and cost of available
child care. STEP treats these two factors in such a way that their effect
on financial incentives varies as they increase or decrease. Other fac-
tors, such as transportation costs, are not subject to special treatment
by STEP, and their effect on financial incentives is therefore constant.
For example, additional transportation costs of $40 per month
decrease the incentive to work by $40 per month, regardless of income
or other expenses. However, additional child care costs of $40 per
month, because they are deductible from earnings up to a ceiling
amount, will have an effect on the recipient's bottom line income that
varies according to income level and total child care cost. For this rea-
son, the following analysis will consider only wages and child care
costs, even though there are other costs associated with working26.
These other costs may simply be deducted from the final amounts
arrived at as the "incentive" amounts.
It should also be born in mind that recipients with day care or hous-
ing subsidies may face increases in day care costs or rent as a result of
participation in STEP.
1. TYPICAL EARNINGS
What jobs are typically available to sole support mothers on social
assistance, and what wages do these jobs typically pay?
Women are more likely to be employed in the service sector than in
the goods-producing sector of the economy. In August 1989, 83% of
women who were employed were employed in the service-producing
sector of the economy, defined as those industries other than agricul-
ture, other primary industries, manufacturing, construction, and utili-
ties. By contrast, only 58% of employed men were employed in the
service sector2 7.
26. Only ongoing costs of employment should be considered. Start-up costs (up to
$250) will be covered by the Employment Start-up Benefit.
27. Statistics Canada, The Labour Force (Ottawa: 1989) at B-22. Comparable fig-
ures for February 1989 are 84.5% and 40%. Figures are for Canada.
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Employment in the service sector is more likely to be part time than
employment in the goods-producing sector. The average number of
hours worked in manufacturing was 40.0 hours per week, and in con-
struction was 42.3 hours per week in August 1989. By contrast, the
average number of hours worked in trade (wholesale and retail) was
37.3 per week, and in services was 36.8 per week.2
The occupational categories employing the most women in Ontario in
1985 were as follows: clerical (31.3%), service29 (17.1%), and sales
(10.0%). These three categories employed 58.4% of employed women.
They employed only 25.3% of employed men3". Occupations in the cat-
egories classified as managerial and professional employed 29.1% of
employed women 31. Jobs in these occupational categories are again
more likely than other jobs to be part time. 32% of jobs in the service
category in 1985 were part time, and 20.5% of clerical jobs32 . This com-
pares to an overall figure of 15.5% of all jobs part time33.
Thus it is not surprising that a high percentage of women work in part
time jobs. In 1985 in Ontario, 26.3% of women who worked did so part
time. In service occupations, 43.6% of women worked part time, in
clerical occupations 23.7% worked part time, and in sales 41.9%
worked part time34. Much part time employment among women is
involuntary, ie. chosen because full time work is unavailable. A Statis-
tics Canada study concluded that "one woman in three working part
time in the service occupations in 1985 did so because she was unable
28. Ibid. at B-35. Figures are for Canada.
29. "Service" as an occupational category should not be confused with the ser-
vice-producing industries.
30. Statistics Canada, "Women in the Workplace: Selected Data" (Ottawa: 1987)
at 59.
31. The categories included in "managerial and professional" are managerial
and administrative, natural sciences, social sciences, religion, teaching, med-
icine and health, and artistic and recreational. The figure is from Statistics
Canada, ibid. at 59. The use of the "managerial and professional" category is
taken from Cecil Dumas, "Occupational Trends Among Women in Canada:
1976-1985" (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1986) at 8.
32. Dumas, ibid. at Table 9. Figures are for Canada.
33. Ibid. at Table 8.
34. Supra, note 30 at 60 and 61.
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to find full time work."35 The high level of part-time work among
women is, among other things, an indication that the structure of lab-
our market itself plays a large part in determining how women are
employed. The jobs that women are actually employed in are often the
only jobs available to them.
What wages do these jobs pay? Average hourly earnings for Canada in
July 1989 for all service producing industries were $10.46. The compa-
rable figure for goods producing industries was $14.1636. These average
figures, however, do not fully reflect the pay differential that exists
between men and women. Data regarding average annual earnings of
full time workers in 1982 show that, in Canada, the average annual
earnings of women were 64% those of men37. In clerical occupations,
earnings of women were 66.9% of men's, and in service occupations
55.5% of men's38 .
These figures only give a rough indication of the wages available to
women. If the average annual income of women employed full time
has continued to be about 65% that of men employed full time, we can
assume that the hourly wages of women in the service-producing
industries are about 65% those of men. Since 53% of employees in
these industries are women, 39 or approximately half, the average wage
of women in these industries can be calculated as follows:
Let X be the average wage of women in the service producing indus-
tries:
[X + (X/.65)]/2 = 10.46
X= 8.24
This figure of $8.24 per hour may overestimate the wages of jobs avail-
able to sole support mothers on social assistance, since it is based on
statistics pertaining to women generally. It includes the wages of well
paid administrative and professional jobs that would be closed to most
social assistance recipients. Women on social assistance and not pres-
35. Supra, note 31 at 21.
36. Statistics Canada, Employment, Earnings and Hours (Ottawa: 1989) at 1.
37. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report (Ottawa: 1985) at 61..
38. Ibid. at 62.
39. Supra, note 27.
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ently working also face the additional barrier of having to enter or re-
enter the workforce after a period of absence.
A 40 hour per week full time job at $8.24 per hour yields a gross
monthly income of $1,427. The monthly earnings of participants in
STEP are unlikely to exceed this amount.
2. CHILD CARE COSTS
There are two kinds of child care: formal, licensed care, usually in day
care centres; and informal, unlicensed care, often in a private home.
The supply of licensed care is extremely limited relative to the
demand. The federal government's Task Force on Child Care esti-
mated that, in 1984, the number of licensed child care spaces in Can-
ada was only 8.8% of the total child care need 40 . Consequently, over
80% of children receiving non-parental care receive it in unlicensed
arrangements41.
The Metro Toronto Day Care Planning Task Force estimated in 1986
that there were 180,000 children in Metro Toronto whose parents work
outside of the home, and that the parents of 90,000 of these children
would choose licensed day care if it were available 42. Yet the total
number of licensed spaces available in Metro was only 26,84743-less
than one third of this estimated demand.
The supply of licensed care is not likely to increase relative to the
demand for it in the near future. The Ontario government, in
announcing in 1987 new spending intended to build a "comprehensive
child care system that will meet the needs of all citizens"44 predicted
only a 25-30% growth in the capacity of the licensed system over the
three years from 1987 to 199045. Given that this probably overestimates
the actual growth being experienced, unlicensed, informal care will
remain the predominant form of child care for the foreseeable future.
40. Status of Women Canada, Report of the Task Force on Child Care (Ottawa: 1986)
at 51.
41. Ibid. at 45.
42. Metropolitan Toronto Day Care Planning Task Force, "Blueprint for Child
Care Services: Realistic Responses to the Need" (Toronto: 1986) at 7.
43. Ibid. at 6.
44. COMSOC, "New Direction for Child Care" (Toronto: 1987) at i.
45. Ibid. at 17.
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How much does licensed child care cost? The Social Planning Council
of Metro Toronto, in its Guides for Family Budgeting, stated that the
typical cost in 1987 for day care centres operated by Metro Toronto
Children's Services was $33 per day for infants and toddlers, $21 per
day for pre-school aged children, and $11.50 per day for school aged
children46. For a parent employed full time, that works out to $714.45,
$454.65, and $248.98 per child per month respectively47.
The availability of subsidies is limited. In 1986, only 15,250 children in
Metro Toronto were assisted by subsidies48, yet the Metro Toronto
Day Care Planning Task Force estimated the demand for subsidized
spaces at 30,00049. Furthermore, the subsidies of participants in STEP,
if they do have them, may decrease as their earned income increases50.
The cost of unlicensed child care is more difficult to specify. The fed-
eral Task Force on Child Care conducted a telephone survey in 1984
and found that fees for unlicensed home day care in Ontario were
approximately 60% of fees charged by licensed day care centres for
infants, and 80% of fees charged by such centres for pre-schoolers 51. If
similar ratios prevail today, unlicensed care in Metro Toronto would
average about $20 per day for infants ($17 per day for pre-schoolers).
The amount of $20 per day seems typical based on discussions held
with sole support parents during the course of presentations on STEP
by the author. This is equivalent to $433 per month.
The cost of child care for additional children from the same family
may be discounted. This is more likely to be true of informal, unli-
censed arrangements. The federal Task Force on Child Care found
that 52% of unlicensed caregivers gave discounts for second children,
46. Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Guides for Family Budgeting
(Toronto: 1987) at 122.
47. These figures are arrived at by multiplying the daily rate by five days per
week and 4.33 weeks per month.
48. Supra, note 42 at 6.
49. Ibid. at 20.
50. See p. 9 infra.
51. Supra, note 40 at 195. The figures provided are $5010 per year for infants in
licensed centres (about $19 per day), $3820 for pre-schoolers in licensed cen-
tres ($14.70 per day), and $3050 per year for licensed home care for both
infants and pre-schoolers ($11.73 per day).
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averaging 45%. Only 30% of licensed centres gave similar discounts,
averaging 30%52.
Thus the cost of full time care for one infant or pre-school age child is
likely to range from $400 to $700 per month. For two such children,
costs will range from $600 to $1400 per month. For school age chil-
dren fewer hours of care are required, and costs are accordingly lower.
The same is true for part time employment.
3. QUANTIFYING THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
The financial incentive faced by a sole support mother currently
receiving social assistance to undertake employment is the difference
between what her total income will be while working less additional
expenses incurred because of working, on the one hand, and her pres-
ent total income on the other hand.
The financial incentive can be represented by the following expression:
Let NI represent present welfare/FB entitlement
Let N2 represent welfare/FB entitlement while working
Let X represent income from employment
Let Y represent cost of additional child care
Let I represent financial incentive
I=X-Y+N2-N1
This should be modified by recognition of the difference between
gross and net employment income. It is the net income that is relevant
to the decision that a recipient will make, and thus to the financial
incentive. An additional tax refund, though possible, is unlikely and in
any case would not be seen until too late a time to be relevant to the
decision. Mandatory deductions for the range of incomes being exam-
ined can be estimated at 10% of gross income.53 Therefore the above
equation should be modified to read as follows:
I = (.9)X - Y + N2 - N1
What is the value of N2 (the new welfare or FB entitlement)? The pro-
cedure for calculating it is set forth in Chapter 1. For a sole support
mother, it can be represented as follows:
52. Ibid. at 196 and 197.
53. Supra, note 22.
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Let max(A, B) be the maximum of the two values A and B
Let min(A, B) be the minimum of the two values A and B
For licensed care:
N2 = N1 - min[Nl, max0, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - Y]J
For unlicensed care for one child age 0-5:
N2 = NI - min[Nl, maxO, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - min(390, Y)I]
Other amounts should be substituted for the child care ceiling of 390
as appropriate, e.g. 346 for one child aged 5-12 years, 780 for two chil-
dren aged 0-5 years.
Therefore, the financial incentive amount (I) is as follows:
I = (.9)X - Y + N1 - min[Ni, maxO, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - min(390,
Y)J - Ni;
or
I = (.9)X - Y - min[NI, maxO, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - min(390, Y)]1.
The value of this expression as earnings and child care costs vary is illus-
trated in the following series of graphs. All are applicable to a sole sup-
port mother on Family Benefits receiving the maximum shelter subsidy
and with nothing presently being deducted from her cheque. Graphs 1
and 2 are for unlicensed child care; the ceiling for child care costs used is
that for one child aged less than 5 years ($390). Graph 1 shows I at vari-
ous levels of earnings over the range of child care costs from zero to
$800/month. Graph 2 reverses this, showing I at various levels of child
care costs over the range of earnings from zero to $2000/month.
It appears from graph 1 that STEP affects the financial incentives
faced over a range of incomes between roughly $200 per month and
roughly $2000 per month. This is due to the fact that, below $175 per
month, the entire amount of earned income is exempted so that one's
FB entitlement is never reduced regardless of child care costs. Above
$1900 per month, chargeable earnings are high enough that the entitle-
ment is always reduced to zero, again regardless of child care costs54.
54. This assumes an FB entitlement before STEP of $917 per month, as explained
above. Gross earnings of $1900 per month result in chargeable earnings of $916
per month if the maximum child care exemption is claimed.
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It is over the range between these two extremes that STEP taxes back
a part of the FB entitlement. Graph 2 shows that there may or may
not be a positive financial incentive to work over that range, depend-
ing on the level of child care costs. At $200 per month child care, there
is an incentive over that entire range of generally between $200 and
$400. However, at $600 per month child care there is no positive finan-
cial incentive until earnings exceed $800 per month, and then the
incentive will be less than $200 per month until income exceeds $1900
per month. At $800 per month child care, there is no positive incentive
at all unless earnings exceed $1800 per month.
The effect of a higher or lower Family Benefits entitlement (before
STEP) is to broaden the range of earnings levels over which the enti-
tlement is taxed back. A lower entitlement would affect Graph 2 by
moving the point at which the lines begin to curve sharply upward to
the left, and a higher entitlement would move that point to the right.
An increase in the applicable ceiling amount for child care expenses
(which would tend to go together with a higher previous entitlement)
has a somewhat different effect. Graphs 3 and 4 below illustrate this
by showing the incentives faced where child care is licensed, and there
is therefore no ceiling on child care expenses. They once again assume
0
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gross monthly employment earnings
a sole support mother on Family Benefits with one child, maximum
shelter subsidy, and no other present deductions from her cheque.
Graphs illustrating the situation where there is a ceiling amount, but
higher than $390 per month, would show a pattern somewhere
between the preceding set of graphs and the following set.
By comparing Graph 3 with Graph 1, one can see that incentives have
been altered only for higher earnings levels and child care cost levels.
Incentives appear to be higher for earnings over about $600 and child
care over about $500 per month.
Graph 4 shows that a positive financial incentive is now faced at all
levels of child care expense, provided that child care does not exceed
90% of gross earnings. However, the amount of the incentive is still in
all cases less than about $400 per month over the entire range that the
Family Benefits entitlement is taxed back.
The following graph (Graph 5) illustrates the range of earned incomes
and child care expenses for which there is a positive financial incen-
tive, by plotting earned income directly against child care expenses.
The lines indicate where the financial incentive is zero, for licensed
care and for unlicensed care assuming a ceiling on the deductibility of
child care expenses of $390 per month.
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Recipients face a positive financial incentive for combinations of the
two factors falling below the lines. It can be seen that, for licensed care
(ie. no ceiling on deductibility of child care expenses), a positive incen-
tive is faced wherever net earned income exceeds child care expenses.
For unlicensed care, there is an additional range of earnings/child
care combinations that do not create a positive incentive. Where the
ceiling on child care deductibility is greater than $390, the line for
unlicensed care will fall somewhere between the two lines illustrated.
The above discussion of earnings and child care costs concluded that
earnings are unlikely to exceed $1427 per month, and child care costs
are likely to be in the $400 to $700 range for full time care for one
child aged less than 5. Under such circumstances, a recipient will face
an incentive of no more than about $300. Gross earnings of $1427 and
unlicensed child care expenses of $400 per month yield an incentive of
$309. The same earnings with unlicensed child care expenses of $700
per month yields an incentive of only $9.
A recipient with more than two children may easily face child care
costs that exceed her net income from employment. Under such cir-
cumstances she can never face a positive financial incentive to work
under this program.
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4. THE WORKING POOR
Sole support mothers who are presently working full time did not qualify
for welfare or Family Benefits prior to STEP, due to the rule prohibiting
more than 120 hours of work per month. However, with the removal of
that rule, and the deductibility of child care expenses, many may now
qualify for a "top up" amount while continuing to work full time.
Applicants will only be eligible for the top up if they meet all other
criteria of categorical eligibility. In particular, ceilings on liquid assets
still apply. In effect, the money can only be received if it is going to be
spent in the near future.
The amount of the top up is the amount termed "N2" in the calcula-
tion above-the new welfare or FB entitlement The formula for calcu-
lating it is thus the following, where NI is what the entitlement would
be if there were no earned income, X is the earned income, and Y is
the child care expenses.
For licensed care:
N2 = N1 - min[N1, maxO, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - YJ
For unlicensed care, for one child age 0-5:
N2 = NI - min[N1, maxO, (.8)[(.9)X - 175 - min(390, Y)fl
Graph 6 shows the combinations of earned income and child care expenses
for which a top up amount may be received, in the case of a sole support
mother with one child aged less than five years, receiving the maximum shelter
subsidy, with no other deductions from her cheque. Combinations below the
lines qualify for a top up amount As may be observed, earnings less than
$1468 per month will qualify for a top up regardless of child care expenses. 55
The effect of the ceiling on deductibility of unlicensed care is to impose a ceil-
ing on earned income of $1900 per month, above which no top up may be
received regardless of actual child care expenses.
This means that sole support mothers working full time and earning
average wages will qualify for a top up. At $1427 earned income per
month, the top up in the above mentioned circumstances would be
$30 plus 80% of child care expenses up to the ceiling amount The
maximum top up would be $342.
55. Based on an entitlement (without earned income) of $917. The equivalent figure
for other entitlements for a sole support mother can be calculated as
[1.25(Nl)+1751.9.
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The result is that sole support mothers currently on assistance face rel-
atively little incentive to leave assistance, while many sole support
mothers currently not on assistance will qualify. STEP may ironically
have the effect of increasing the Family Benefits caseload of sole sup-
port mothers considerably.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
The preceding chapter considered the financial incentives that sole sup-
port mothers will face to engage in employment under STEP. But how
relevant are such financial incentives to the decision that a sole support
mother will make regarding participation in the labour market? To
answer this question, the nature of the labour market and of the partici-
pation of assistance recipients in it must be examined more closely.
Patricia Evans has identified three major approaches to increasing the
employability of social assistance recipients: the service strategy, the
financial strategy, and the work strategy56. The service strategy
attempts to increase the employability of recipients by providing train-
56. P. Evans, "Perspectives on Work, Women and Welfare: A Dual Labour Market
Analysis" (Toronto: University of Toronto Faculty of Social Work, 1983) at 69.
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ing, education, and support services such as day care. The financial
strategy attempts to improve the financial incentives faced by recipi-
ents contemplating entering the market. The work strategy attempts to
increase the supply of available jobs by altering the labour market.
STEP is a financial strategy.
The financial strategy is based on assumptions of economic rationality
characteristic of classical economic theory. Individuals are assumed to be
engaging in a process of maximizing their self-interest by choosing among
two or more available alternatives. The labour market is not itself a focus of
analysis, but simply the background to this process of "rational" individual
choice.57 Yet these assumptions do not reflect the realities of low income
people's lives. Social assistance and low paying jobs are not so much
options from which one chooses as they are necessities that one is forced
into and out of. There is little scope for the exercise of choice.
Evans argues that the labour market confines sole support mothers on
assistance to jobs that are badly paid and unstable-that form part of the
"marginal labour market" 58 For this reason, these women move back
and forth between work and welfare, alternating short periods on assis-
tance with short periods of employment5 9 They also frequently mix part
time work with receipt of social assistance.W Because of the instability
and low wages, getting a job cannot be equated with ongoing financial
independence for people confined to the marginal labour market.
This pattern of "cycling" in and out of the labour market is found
among sole support mothers on social assistance in Ontario today.
More than one-quarter (26%) of the sole support mothers who entered
the Family Benefits caseload for the first time in 1975 had left and
returned again by 1984.61 A random sample of cases leaving FBA
between September 1978 and August 1979 found that 38% of the sole
support mothers returned over the next seven years.62 This pattern of
57. Ibid. at 13-19.
58. Ibid. at 20.
59. Ibid. at 7. See also Mildred Rein, Work or Welfare?: Factors in the Choice for
AFDC Mothers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974) at 20-32.
60. Supra, note 56 at 9, and Rein, ibid.
61. Patricia Evans, "A Decade of Change: FBA Caseload, 1975-1986", SARC
Background Paper #42, June 1987, at 18-19.
62. Ibid. at 17.
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leaving and returning to social assistance mirrors a pattern of leaving
and returning to the labour market. There is also substantial mixing of
assistance with part time work: 31.5% of sole support mothers who
began receiving Family Benefits in 1981 reported some earned income
while on family benefits within the following three years.
63
This indicates that labour market conditions are the primary determi-
nants of the employment behaviour of assistance recipients, and that
financial incentives are of secondary importance. When jobs are avail-
able, people take them, and when jobs are not available they go back
on assistance.
Empirical studies of the effect of financial incentives on employment
patterns of assistance recipients generally do not show that they have a
significant effect. Mildred Rein surveyed empirical studies of the effect
on AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) mothers in the
United States of the introduction in 1969 of exemptions for earned
income. Before 1969, earned income was taxed back dollar for dollar
in most states. After 1969, thirty dollars per month plus one third of all
earned income was exempted. She concluded that "it would appear
that the thirty and one third earnings exemption did not have an
appreciable effect on the work effort of AFDC mothers." 64 A survey of
AFDC mothers in 1972 showed that 80% said they had engaged in no
work-related behaviour as a result of the increased incentive, about 6%
said they had started to work because of it, and none had left welfare
as a result of the new policy.65
Although some studies have concluded that increases in the tax back
rate on earned income lead to decreases in the willingness of recipi-
ents to work, the magnitude of this effect is small. One study of AFDC
mothers in the United States estimated that a 10% increase in the tax
back rate on earned income would lead to a 1 to 3% reduction in the
employment rate of recipients.6
63. Ibid. at 21.
64. Mildred Rein, Dilemmas of Welfare Policy: Why Work Strategies Haven't
Worked (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) at 61.
65. Ibid. at 56.
66. Stanley Masters and Irwin Garfinkel, Estimating the Labour Supply Effects of
Income Maintenance Alternatives (New York: Academic Press, 1977) at 173.
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Thus, the financial incentives discussed in the preceding section will
not be likely to have a major impact on the employment behaviour of
sole support mothers receiving assistance. Changes to the labour mar-
ket itself will have to take place before the goal of long term financial
independence for the majority of these women can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
While it is true that recipients themselves requested the kinds of
changes to the benefit structure that constitute STEP, that request was
always in the context of broader and more fundamental reforms. The
Advisory Group of Sole Support Parents to SARC, for example, rec-
ommended the use of net instead of gross earnings, an increase in
earnings ceilings, and that child care expenses be deductible67. But
they also recommended provision of adequate child care, adequate
housing, raising the minimum wage, and a guaranteed adequate
annual income68. In the context of such broad reforms, STEP would
be in the best interest of recipients.
As an isolated initiative, however, it has entirely different effects and
implications. As we have seen, financial incentives alone are unlikely to
make a significant difference to recipients, especially on the scale of those
created by STEP. Such an isolated reform of financial incentives to
employment was not recommended to SARC by assistance recipients.
Among the organizations that did advocate such an approach was the
Business Council on National Issues, which submitted the following:
"We recommend that measures be undertaken to create positive incen-
tives for labour market participation by the able-to-work unemployed
on social assistance, although we do not believe that expenditure
reduction should be a goal of reform in this area. Indeed, it is likely
that some additional expenditures may be required... however, we
urge that any additional expenditures in this area be financed by real-
location within the social policy envelope."69
67. Advisory Group of Sole Support Parents to the Social Assistance Review Com-
mittee, "Report", (Toronto: 1987), recommendation 11, at 23.
68. Ibid., recommendations 16, 8, 12, and I respectively, at iv-ix.
69. Business Council on National Issues, "Social Policy Reform and the
National Agenda", (Ottawa: 1986) at 30-31.
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The reforms announced on May 18, 1989, bear considerably more
resemblance to the recommendations of this business organization
than they do to the recommendations of recipients.
STEP and related reforms should not be regarded as implementation
of Stage 1 of Transitions. Nor should they be regarded as a response to
the concerns raised by social assistance recipients before SARC.
Unfortunately, both the publicity that surrounded the May 18
announcement and the failure of those groups lobbying for implemen-
tation of Transitions to respond have created in the public mind a per-
ception that the Government has responded to Transitions and given
assistance recipients what they asked for. This perception results in a
very dangerous political situation for assistance recipients, and sole
support mothers in particular.
The danger arises from the expectation of results that goes along with
such a perception. We have seen in previous chapters of this paper
that STEP does not create financial incentives that sole support moth-
ers on assistance are likely to respond to. The trend toward an
increased assistance caseload of sole support mothers is likely to accel-
erate as a result of STEP. But the public has been led to expect reli-
ance on assistance to decrease, because additional public money is
being spent to help recipients "move from dependence to auton-
omy."'70 When this expectation fails to materialize, it is the sole sup-
port mothers themselves who will be blamed, because they have not
engaged in the behaviour STEP is intended to promote.
This blame is likely to take the form of a mandatory requirement of
participation in STEP or some other form of employment-oriented
program. Five out of ten provinces already have such a work or train-
ing requirement for sole support mothers: British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Nova Scotia.71 Transitions itself foreshad-
ows the eventual introduction of "workfare" 72 for sole support moth-
70. Supra, note 10 at 2.
71. Stairs, supra, (revised), note 20 at 31.
72. The term "workfare" is here used in the sense of a programwhere entitle-
ment to benefits is conditional upon participation in activities intended to
lead to employment or increase employability, rather than in the more nar-
row sense of a program where benefits are wages for make-work projects.
See Melanie Hess, "Traditional Workfare: Pros and Cons", SARC Back-
ground Paper #21, April 1987.
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ers. As Felicite Stairs has pointed out, Transitions exempts sole support
mothers from conditional entitlement to benefits only because they
have such a strong desire as a group to participate in the labour
force.73 It is "unnecessary to compel" sole support mothers to partici-
pate in employment related programs.74 Such a rationale carries with
it the implication that, should they fail to take advantage of opportuni-
ties made available to them, compulsion would be appropriate.
Sole support mothers are the fastest growing portion of the Family
Benefits caseload already.75 If STEP results in this caseload growing
even faster, conditional entitlement in some form will be a very attrac-
tive option politically, especially if the public has been convinced that
STEP has made it easier for sole support mothers to choose to leave
assistance. The ultimate consequence of STEP may therefore be work-
fare for sole support mothers.
73. Supra, (revised) note 20 at 22-25.
74. Supra, note I at 232.
75. Ibid. at 37.
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APPENDIX "A"
WOULD YOU BE BETrER OFF WORKING?
STEP 1 - Your earnings from employment
Use the figures from your pay stub if you can. If you don't know the
exact amounts of the deductions, estimate them as one tenth (10%) of
the gross earnings.





Subtract deductions from gross earnings
- these are your net earnings
This must be converted to a monthly amount If you used your weekly
earnings, multiply by 4.33. If you used your earnings for two weeks,
multiply by 2.17.
Net monthly earnings
STEP 2 - Exemptions from earnings
Flat rate exemption
- single (no children) on GWA, $75
- single (no children) on FBA, $160
- family on GWA, $150
- sole support parent (GWA or FBA), $175
Child care expenses up to a maximum amount:
If care is unlicensed, the maximum amount is $390 for each child less
than 5 years old, plus $346 for each child aged 5 to 12. If child care is
licensed, the full amount can be exempted. No amounts can be
exempted for children over 12.
Child care expenses exempted
Add flat rate exemption and child care exemption
- these are your total exemptions
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STEP 3 - Your chargeable earnings
Chargeable earnings are the earnings that will be deducted from your




- (this amount cannot be less than zero)
Multiply this amount by four fifths (.8) to obtain your chargeable
earnings.
Chargeable earnings




To see if you would be better off working, you must compare your
total income while working with your total expenses while working:
Income: Expenses:
GWA or FBA Present expenses




Would you be better off working? Only you can make that decision.
BUFFER ZONE: If your new FBA or GWA entitlement is less than
zero, you may still be eligible to receive health benefits. You are eligi-
ble if your chargeable earnings exceed your present entitlement by less
than $100 (for sole support parents), or $50 (for singles without chil-
dren.)
NOTES: Do not use this worksheet if you have income from a train-
ing allowance rather than from employment Do not use it if you have
a spouse with income. In these cases, different calculations must be
used.
